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Introduction
Researching political violence and terrorism is a controver-
sial and emotive endeavour. Conducting qualitative field-
work with survivors of political violence and terror attacks 
would be rightly considered a quintessentially ‘sensitive 
research topic’ (Renzetti and Lee, 1993) by ethical review 
boards. The mental and psychosomatic well-being of par-
ticipants with distressing experiences of violence is a cru-
cial consideration, as is the welfare of the researcher. Doing 
justice to such considerations, including securing ethical 
approval in the first place, necessarily engages a range of 
practical, interactive and presentational registers variously 
typical of ‘emotional labour’ (Hochschild, 2012; Ward and 
McMurray, 2016). This article explores the somewhat grey 
areas between ‘told’ and ‘untold’ aspects of such a project 
and its ethical processes.
Ethical discussions concerning death and bereavement 
abound within eponymous research fields (see, inter alia, 
Briller et al., 2008; Carmack and Degroot, 2014; Williams 
et al., 2008). Many, however, occupy a somewhat ‘special-
ised’ or technical space divorced from broader methodologi-
cal controversies which should concern us all. Cognisant of 
Denzin’s (2017: 8) call for a renewed and critical exploration 
into what counts as legitimate and ethical inquiry, this article 
takes Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) distinction between 
‘procedural ethics’ and ‘ethics in practice’ as a point of 
departure and return for reflecting on a doctoral research pro-
ject exploring the trauma and harms faced by survivors of 
political violence and terrorism.
Fifteen years since their work first appeared, it is not hard 
to connect Guillemin and Gillam’s concern to unpack the 
often-contradictory relationship between the theory and prac-
tice of ethical social science research with Denzin’s (2017) 
more contemporaneous rallying cry. As I will make clear, their 
work encourages us to think carefully about ‘the standpoint of 
the inquirer’ and certainly rebuts the idea of ‘a God’s eye view 
that guarantees absolute methodological certainty’ (Denzin, 
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2017: 12). In the spirit of ‘self-learning’ and ‘self-criticism’ 
encouraged among the international qualitative inquiry com-
munity (Denzin, 2017: 14), this article subjects the methodo-
logical rationale of their original work – particularly the faith 
they ultimately place in reflexivity – to comparative empirical 
scrutiny against the backcloth of this doctoral work.
Research ethics are often divorced into approval processes 
at the institutional level and ethical practices of researchers at 
an individual or interactional level – a dichotomy which often 
ignores the relationship between the two. In many ways, 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) provide a valuable and welcome 
corrective to such reductive either/or accounts of ‘doing ethi-
cal research’. They begin with a moving vignette, encouraging 
readers to picture a scenario in which they are interviewing 
Sonia, a woman in her late 40s, living with diagnosed heart 
disease. The interview is part of a study examining women’s 
experiences of living with the condition. Sonia is married and 
lives with her husband and their teenage daughter in a rural 
region on a remote farming property. The interview is taking 
place in the kitchen over a cup of tea and is progressing well, 
until you ask Sonia about the general impact of heart disease 
on her life. At this point, she stops responding and tears begin 
welling up in her eyes. She has not been coping well, though 
not because of her heart disease. Sonia discloses that her hus-
band has been sexually abusing their daughter since she was a 
child. It is this revelation, rather than living with heart disease, 
which Sonia is clearly anguished by most and which the inter-
view, for a whole host of potential and unknown reasons, pro-
vides a space and time to disclose.
As Guillemin and Gillam (2004: 261) rightly state, ‘This 
kind of scenario is not unusual when conducting qualitative 
research’. They argue that while institutional ethics cannot 
possibly observe (much less actually regulate) such ‘micro-
ethics’, or ‘ethically important moments’, which may arise 
while conducting social research (see also Haggerty, 2004; 
Hammersley, 2009), such institutional requirements do 
serve to reiterate the importance of good ethical practice. 
They argue that this can be achieved more fruitfully, how-
ever, if researchers embrace ‘reflexivity’, not just to produce 
rigorous but responsive research, attuned to fieldwork con-
tingencies including unexpected and sometimes distressing 
scenarios for participants and researchers.
Aided and inspired by Guillemin and Gillam (2004), this 
article is written in three parts, each of which engages differ-
ent aspects of their work in some way. The first provides an 
overview of my doctoral research exploring survivors’ expe-
riences of political violence and terrorism, for which institu-
tional ethical approval was sought and secured. While this 
section contextualises the research setting and requisites 
associated with Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) ‘procedural 
ethics’, it points to the always-already-contradictory logics at 
play as I manoeuvred myself into a position of ethical legiti-
macy. The second section explores challenging fieldwork 
experiences or periods of particularly fatiguing ‘emotional 
labour’ (Hochschild, 2012; Ward and McMurray, 2016). It 
considers how neatly this ‘fits’ into Hochschild’s oft-cited 
study of emotions and labour processes, highlighting some 
of the everyday methods employed to negotiate these chal-
lenges. This included spontaneous and deliberate forms of 
humour among both researcher and participants, occurring 
against a normalised backdrop of humour among gatekeep-
ers, and routine interactions with people beyond designated 
mentors and supervisors. Finally, this article returns to the 
distinction between ‘procedural ethics’ and ‘ethics in prac-
tice’ to reflect on the extent to which this separation, if only 
heuristic, is warranted or useful for thinking about the pro-
claimed importance of ‘reflexivity’.
An overview of the study and its 
‘procedural ethics’
My research focused on the work of a small charity, the Tim 
Parry Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace (abbreviated here-
after to ‘FfP’), based in Warrington, a large town in the North 
West of England. FfP’s origins began on 20 March 1993, 
when two Irish Republican Army (IRA1) bombs exploded in 
Warrington town centre, killing 12-year-old Tim Parry and 
3-year-old Johnathan Ball. Bronwen Vickers, a 32-year-old 
mother of two, was severely injured and died a year later from 
skin cancer which medical experts believed could have been 
aggravated by this event. The FfP was later founded by Tim 
Parry’s parents, Colin and Wendy. A detailed history of the 
FfP is beyond the scope of this article, but it is important to 
briefly consider their contemporary work to situate the dis-
cussion that follows. The charity operates several strands. 
Participants and activities described here form part of the 
Survivors Assistance Network (SAN). SAN encompasses a 
diverse time and place-range of incidents and conflicts includ-
ing both state and non-state violence, primarily in England 
and Northern Ireland, but also more recent terror attacks in 
parts of Europe, Africa and Asia. Despite this breadth, the 
premise of SAN activities is, in essence, deceptively modest. 
This includes free practical and emotional support to individ-
uals and families affected by political violence and terrorism, 
in order to ‘facilitate the sharing of experiences and dialogue 
where appropriate to the needs of survivors’ (The Tim Parry 
Johnathan Ball Foundation for Peace, 2017).
The charity runs weekend-long residential events, which 
are often the first-time new participants to the FfP talk about 
their experiences to fellow survivors, providing a catalyst for 
friendships, networks and short/long-term relationships to 
flourish. The organisation’s core tenet revolves around con-
flict resolution and peace, providing both survivors and for-
mer combatants a safe space in which they can interact. These 
aims, and their operationalisation, change continuously in a 
rapidly moving landscape. As a small charity increasingly 
dependent upon commission rather than grant-based funding 
(see Simmonds, 2016) to design and implement ‘innovative’ 
(i.e. partly, politically attractive), or ‘good projects’ (see 
Krause, 2014), its practical organisational work rarely sits 
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still for long. The trajectory of the FfP, however, from its gen-
esis to the present, continues to be told and retold by benefi-
ciaries and staff – a powerful and emotive form of 
organisational storytelling (Gabriel, 2000), fortifying its iden-
tity among new, existing and potential future audiences.
I made regular fieldwork visits from the beginning of the 
project to familiarise myself with these activities and, by 
extension, the FfP’s participants, some of whom would go on 
to be interviewed. Institutional approval by an ethics commit-
tee to conduct in-depth, audio recorded interviews were sub-
mitted, and granted approval, just less than 12 months after 
the start of the project. Between 16 and 24 months since the 
start of the project, these interviews were used to explore 
individual narratives in more detail. Ongoing fieldwork visits 
to the Foundation eventually allowed prospective participants 
to be approached; most showed great interest in the project 
without being directly solicited and some had already made 
enquiries about taking part. This elongated phase of ‘gaining 
access’ was an immersive, yet informal, process where casual 
conversations could play out. I avoided a purely instrumental 
approach to ‘data collection’; people expressed themselves 
‘off the record’ before committing to recorded interviews. 
Without the full immersion required to constitute ethnogra-
phy as ‘deep hanging out’ (Geertz, 1998), this approach was 
akin to Forsey’s (2010) ‘ethnography as participant listening’. 
Although more solid, structured participant recruitment 
became a realistic necessity, it was not a primary considera-
tion for at least the first 14–18 months of the fieldwork.
Although interviews took place after an independent review 
board had granted full ethical approval, this does not mean that 
I did not ‘enter the field’ until then. My ability to faithfully 
promise close supervision of the data collection process within 
my formal institutional ethics application – including transpar-
ent information sharing between staff and myself around when 
and where subsequent interviews took place; arranging post-
interview debriefing between staff and survivors; and sharing 
important up-to-date information about unfolding dynamics 
within and between different groups attending the charity – 
rested precisely on these periods of preliminary meetings, visits, 
observations and invitations to attend events and talks. During 
this time, I was able to get to know staff, discuss our respective 
expectations and establish working boundaries. One might 
think this kind of opportune preliminary involvement within a 
research field common, even ubiquitous, to the point of being 
unworthy of attention. Researchers, supervisors and ethical 
review boards often convey a linear process of ‘gaining access’ 
to research fields as something assuming a particular form, 
articulated in a particular style. That form and style, within 
locally and disciplinarily bound conventions, is a product of an 
order immediately recognisable by the professionals involved 
(the researchers, supervisors, members of ethical review boards, 
etc.). The ethical review procedure ‘is a product of some order 
of relationships where the combination of persons and what 
they’re doing is something seeable as “their business”’ (Sacks, 
1992: 91). ‘Arrangements’, such as those above aimed at 
enhancing safeguarding practice and rigour, simply appear; they 
are not so much ‘put in place’ as just ‘are in place’ at the point of 
application. The not inconsiderable amounts of (emotional) 
labour that have gone into producing these arrangements are 
typically airbrushed from view, or else stylised, ready for a clean 
and robust ethics application to be reviewed and subsequently 
deemed acceptable or unacceptable.
This is characteristic of what Sacks (1992: 83) refers to as 
‘feigning ignorance’. To assume that ethical review boards, 
supervisors and fellow researchers are unaware of the extra 
(emotional) labour that goes into furnishing viable ethical 
research arrangements would be a mistake. They are. Of 
course, they may not all be fully aware of every stage of this 
labour process to the same extent as each other, and each 
may have particular interests and objectives. In my case, a 
working relationship had been garnered between my super-
visory team and the FfP quite some time before I formally 
applied for ethical approval. Due to staff resignations, new 
relationships, new contacts, new forms of trust, and new 
expectations had to be constantly negotiated and renegoti-
ated prior to ‘doing research’. I was introduced and reintro-
duced to survivors, activists and practitioners whose stories I 
heard at various invitational events. Such instances were not 
instigated by me, nor were they audio recorded. They were, 
however, crucial preliminary periods of the research process 
which neither contravened nor were made readily and 
descriptively available to, the as-yet-to-be-completed ethical 
review application. As Sacks (1992: 83) demonstrates, this 
game of ‘feigning ignorance’ ‘has to be learned as a special 
task’ in its own right. This ‘special task’ is captured perfectly 
by Guillemin and Gillam (2004: 263–264):
For many researchers, the completion of the research ethics 
committee’s application form is a formality, a hurdle to surmount 
to get on and do the research. [. . .] we diligently answer the 
questions on the ethics application form, even though they may 
be irrelevant to our research. We have learned to write our 
responses to the questions in ‘ethics-committee speak’. This 
involves using language that the committee will understand, is 
free of jargon, but will nonetheless reassure the committee that 
we are competent and experienced researchers who can be 
trusted. [. . .] Moreover, we have learned to gloss over some 
issues that we know may cause the committee concern, for 
example, giving a transcriber, who is external to the research 
team, access to interview tapes without seeking direct consent 
from the participants, or not to draw too much attention to 
potential, although unlikely, risks to the researchers [. . .]. The 
form asks what measures the researcher/s have put in place in 
the event of unexpected outcomes or adverse effects. As 
indicated in the opening scenario, there are many situations that 
are unexpected when doing research that can potentially have 
adverse consequences – how can you foresee and plan for all of 
these? Most researchers learn quickly that they need to be savvy 
in addressing the potential issues of concern of the committee: 
using the appropriate discourse to ensure that applications will 
be approved as quickly as possible with minimum changes and 
dispute, while remaining true to their research integrity.
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Several contradictions often exist within such careful 
curations, many of which should, in principle, enhance rather 
than jeopardise a project’s chances of approval. This is sel-
dom the case when researchers are tasked with steering their 
project through a diverse and often unfamiliar committee. 
Genuinely, ethical practice, sensitive to the context and prac-
tices taking place within a research field, cannot be achieved 
without some familiarity of it. In theory, a diligent and dis-
cerning panel will want evidence of practical and emotional 
support strategies which mitigate (again, in theory) future 
risk to prospective participants or researchers. There is some-
thing of the work experience paradox at play here, when peo-
ple seeking employment are told they need more work 
experience before they can get a job, except they cannot get 
that experience without first having a job.
In this project and many others involving professionals 
and their services’ ‘users’, the most appropriate and effective 
means of developing relationships, including that textbook 
ideal of ‘rapport’ with potential gatekeepers and participants, 
proves to be the very same source of ideational risk for ethi-
cal review boards. Carving out truly sensitive contexts first 
in which to later think about approaching people for inter-
views could well contravene written parameters of ethical 
review. Conversely, nothing stops researchers who avoid 
such preliminary work until getting ethical approval from 
then clumsily and insensitively pursuing interview opportu-
nities, irrespective of whether people seem ready or willing 
to recall harrowing events. Researchers with more time in 
the field prior to collecting recorded data are not automati-
cally better placed to make these decisions. In a context such 
as this, however, data collection must surely be ‘in-step’ to 
some degree with the daily workings of the organisation 
facilitating access. When deciding who to interview, I some-
times felt uneasy about the terms used by staff to describe 
survivors’ apparent strength or coping mechanisms. It was 
far easier to negotiate these conversations with familiar staff, 
however, than it would be to explain away serious distress 
among participants that I barely knew but decided to inter-
view anyway simply because I had obtained ethical clear-
ance to do so.
In sum, the project successfully outlined its ‘procedural 
ethics’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004) to an ethics review 
board, aided by a promise that all fieldwork and interviews 
would be arranged (not conducted) under the supervision and 
debriefing of FfP staff. Staff acted in a strict debriefing 
capacity without impacting interviews, encouraging and 
facilitating as open a conversation as possible by helping to 
ensure that thought and consideration had gone into who was 
approached for interviews and why in the first place. 
Fulfilling ‘procedural ethics’ was only possible through prior 
meetings with staff, visits to the organisation, invitational 
events and generally ‘getting a feel’ for the day-to-day work-
ings of the charity. Such preliminary work is clearly not 
divorced from practical decision-making, reflecting several 
aspects of Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) ‘ethics in practice’. 
Withstanding this conceptual blur, however, crucial differ-
ences include the spaces in which such preliminary work 
took place (work places not private residences, for example), 
the transparency of such visits (always among groups of peo-
ple at semi-public events rather than one-to-one meetings), 
and the ends to which such visits were directed (familiarity 
with the research setting and ITS participants, rather than 
seeking out members of that setting instrumentally as poten-
tial participants in my own study).
I now turn to some of the challenges that arose once I had 
begun interviewing survivors and reflect, retrospectively of 
course, on perhaps why some of these periods of fieldwork 
became emotionally fraught affairs. Again, just as this sec-
tion has drawn connections with the practical work in the 
field which makes its ‘procedural ethics’ seem more feasible 
to a review board, so too are the project’s unexpected practi-
cal and emotional challenges never fully divorced from its 
ethical safeguarding on paper.
An affective account of the study’s 
‘ethics in practice’
One of the difficulties researchers face as they stumble into 
‘ethically important moments’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004; 
see also Subramani, 2019) is that they are often emotionally 
fraught affairs. While the well-being, safety and protection 
of research participants is rightly prioritised in professional 
guidelines, our ability to fulfil these promises remains partly 
contingent on our own emotional command of the situation. 
This does not mean being emotionally stoic or purposefully 
detached, far from it. In most, if not all, interactions involv-
ing disclosures of violence it would be bizarre to respond in 
an entirely predetermined manner. Responding compassion-
ately, or reverently, or angrily, or cheerily, or sadly, or what-
ever way the situation and its interaction demands – based on 
the things demanding it in the there-and-then of the situation 
– require that we remain alert, attentive, and prepared to per-
form emotionally as the situation requires. No shortlist of 
structural-sociological characteristics, nor an extensive theo-
retical knowledge of them, readily prepares us for how to act 
here. At the very least, hearing harrowing testimony requires 
that we engage in sure and emphatic ways/practices with 
people, whatever those ways/practices look like, whether 
those ways/practices are positively dialogical or contempla-
tively silent encounters. In striving to meet the precedents 
outlined within procedural ethics, some of the most sensi-
tively conducted research is often the most emotionally dif-
ficult for researchers.
An uncharacteristically ‘immersive’ regime of interview-
ing that took place towards the end of 2016 in Northern 
Ireland stands out here. I interviewed several people through-
out the week with the help of ‘Louise’, a gatekeeper who 
kindly contacted mutual contacts. Despite securing accom-
modation for the week and having contact details and agree-
ments from all interviewees, Louise generously insisted on 
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doing as much as she could to ensure things ran smoothly. 
Without her help, I would not have completed half as much 
research as I did that trip. It was a busy week and I managed 
to interview many people I had been hoping to speak with for 
several months. It was also good to spend time with Louise, 
who I had come to know well but only at the FfP. Much of 
the week was spent at her home with her partner and son who 
went about their daily routines. Despite being an unusually 
condensed window of quite intensive fieldwork, I was enjoy-
ing the company of Louise and her family and, careful not to 
make a nuisance of myself, felt glad they had welcomed me 
into their home.
Despite feeling relaxed between daily fieldtrips, when I 
would often be conducting recorded interviews about par-
ticularly harrowing events, I underestimated the degree of 
emotional labour I was constantly investing while participat-
ing in more ordinary interactions with Louise. Although act-
ing initially as a gatekeeper, she and I chatted openly about 
all sorts of things both within and beyond the confines of my 
research. Two important facets of Hochschild’s (2012: 147) 
conceptualisation of emotional labour are worth noting here, 
however. First, it requires face-to-face contact as opposed to 
communication at a distance. In this instance, although I was 
invited to spend time among Louise and her family, I was 
still something of an ‘outsider’ and certainly would not have 
entirely lost my status as someone visiting for work purposes 
given the extensively planned nature of the trip. Perhaps 
more telling then, given this palpable connection to work of 
a particular kind, is Hochschild’s (2012: 147) second point 
about emotional labour – that it requires ‘the worker to pro-
duce an emotional state in another person – gratitude or fear, 
for example’. Research ethics describe a process of garner-
ing rapport, making participants and gatekeepers feel com-
fortable. What if we surpass these rather rudimentary and 
minimal requisites and develop a much fuller and diverse set 
of emotional exchanges with people, as happens all the time 
in other relational contexts? Despite feeling relaxed and 
spontaneous around Louise, I was still investing considera-
ble energy in the ongoing emotional work of impression 
management (Goffman, 1990 [1959]). Qualitative research-
ers surely know how mentally and even physically tiring this 
can be, which made the final part of the trip all the more 
difficult.
Louise and I spent the final couple of days of my trip 
walking around the city together. She knew it was a city 
close to my heart having grown up listening to stories my 
father would tell me about when he lived here many years 
earlier. Indeed, I had shared stories with her about my late 
half-brother who also shared an inextricable connection with 
the place we now walked around. These visits to the city had 
come to feel significant for me, even cathartic. On the penul-
timate day of my stay, I sat down and interviewed Louise 
about her experiences of everyday life during conflict in 
Northern Ireland. Some of what she told me I already knew 
well, but some were new and struck fresh emotional chords. 
Hearing yet another woman disclose her experiences of his-
toric domestic and sexual abuse engendered inner-feelings I 
had felt before upon listening to disclosures by numerous 
female family members, friends and partners. The similarity, 
on some level, of Louise’s story made it even more difficult 
to hear. It created a sort of emotional liminality in which nei-
ther empathetic spontaneity based on personal experience 
nor procedural responses based on professional research eth-
ics seemed able to engage and lurch into action in any satis-
factory way.
On one level it felt reminiscent of Wakeman’s (2014) 
description of a biography-emotion intersection in conduct-
ing fieldwork, where experiences as researchers tread famil-
iar emotional paths to those experienced elsewhere at other 
times and places, except the tacit and intuitive ability of 
knowing how to respond most surely which he portrays 
failed me. Nothing happened, much like it probably had not 
many times before when Louise disclosed her abuse to peo-
ple. Nothing bad and nothing good, as far as I could discern. 
When it came time for me to leave the following day, Louise 
and I both expressed how much we had enjoyed the week. 
She said how well she thought I had gotten on with her teen-
age son who suffers from Tourette’s syndrome. We had spo-
ken lots during my stay and she felt it was good for his 
confidence that he had enjoyed the chance to talk with some-
one new. I left for home after saying our goodbyes. It was an 
odd feeling reflecting on the trip in the following days and 
weeks. I was mentally and physically exhausted, feeling a 
mixture of upset, anger, sadness at stories I had heard, and an 
even bigger range of positive feelings too. This maelstrom of 
affect stayed with me for weeks and I really struggled, 
despite meetings with professional mentors and supervisors, 
to focus on my everyday tasks or to really make any sense of 
how I felt about the trip.
Around a month or so later, I travelled to the home of a 
man called ‘George’. George had asked during our first 
meeting if I wanted to interview him for my research and 
12 months later I was pursuing his offer. Perhaps due to a 
combination of the previous fieldtrip and the fact that I felt 
George’s story to be a particularly harrowing one, my 
approach to this visit and interview was entirely different.2 In 
contrast with my interviews the previous month, I felt like I 
knew what the focus of George’s discussions would be and, 
rightly or wrongly, I felt mentally braced. Knowing my par-
ticipants for some time prior to interviews meant, I would 
often have observed them telling and retelling stories in dif-
ferent settings. While I still invested an emotional labour into 
our time together and interview, I felt that I had exposed my 
emotions and those of my participants during the previous, 
schedule-filled period of fieldwork. I remember calling my 
sister on my way to George’s home and recounting how dif-
ficult this had been. I always felt a tension between ignoring 
the potential for vicarious impacts on me as a researcher and 
selfishly embellishing other people’s experiences. Ironically, 
spending so much time familiarising myself with prospective 
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participants in as ‘slow’ a way as possible resulted in some 
relatively intensive periods of interviewing towards the end 
of the project’s ‘data collection’ timeframe. I spent time at 
George’s home, conducted our interview, and similarly spent 
lots of time chatting over dinner just as I had with Louise. I 
left for home with a totally different experience again. I felt I 
had conducted myself empathetically and naturally as before, 
but I also seemed to have instinctively opened up less, not in 
how much I contributed or shared, but more in how much I 
allowed George’s words to move me. As I reflected in the 
days afterwards, I felt much more stable and even sanguine, 
but consequently somewhat detached – not a feeling I had 
experienced before following such a quintessentially sensi-
tive and harrowing interview.
Many scholars, particularly from qualitative health and 
social work research, counselling therapies and ‘psy’ disci-
plines (Rose, 1998), recognise the potential toll of emotional 
fieldwork on researchers and participants alike (see, inter 
alia, Dickson-Swift et al., 2008, 2009; Hubbard et al., 2001). 
This has not always been matched by proactive efforts on the 
part of university ethics committees to protect researchers 
(Dickson-Swift et al., 2007). In line with Dickson-Swift 
et al.’s (2008) findings from interviewing public health 
researchers, I drew upon a mixture of formal/informal, struc-
tured/unstructured, and regular/infrequent supervision and 
debriefing throughout the project with a range of different 
people (FfP contacts, supervisors, partner, friends, family) in 
an attempt to avoid both emotional distress and ‘researcher 
burnout’ (Dickson-Swift et al., 2008: 136). But some attempts 
were more successful than others, and theory seldom helps 
one to forecast disclosures of violence – its content, its affect, 
nor what we do with that affect. Some sad, sombre, angry or 
other emotions were better anticipated than others. They 
assumed both private (emotions I felt ‘quietly’ on my own) 
and co-constructed (emotions that were produced collec-
tively between participants and myself) forms (Riessman, 
2008: 40). It was largely prior ‘expectancy’ or ‘preparedness’ 
before undertaking interviews or fieldwork that dictated my 
inner composure, rather than the incredibly important 
debriefs with FfP staff and my supervisors. Being relaxed 
and assuming of my own well-being around participants I 
had come to know was often jolted upon hearing new infor-
mation or more emotive iterations of their stories, whereas I 
was mentally ‘braced’ for certain interviews I knew would be 
particularly difficult to conduct. Difficult interviews seemed 
to ‘harden’ me somewhat ahead of subsequent interviews 
where I would not forsake being empathetic but would not 
allow myself to feel perhaps as involved as I previously had 
(Waters et al., 2020 – in this Special Issue).
I definitely experienced a period of ‘researcher burnout’ 
(Dickson-Swift et al., 2008: 136) towards the end of 2016, 
caused by a combination of difficult substantive discussions, 
tiredness and pushing myself to do fieldwork in a more con-
densed window of time to keep the thesis ‘on track’. The 
main way participants and I traversed such instances or 
periods was through humour. Humour appeared repeatedly 
throughout the fieldwork and data analysis as a coping motif. 
It featured as both an aspect of our interview interactions and 
in participants’ reflections of how they had coped with diffi-
cult periods in the past. Louise, for example, recalled several 
stories from her childhood in Northern Ireland during The 
Troubles that still, to this day, really make her laugh. She, 
and others, would sometimes reflect fondly on these times, 
highlighting the fact that ‘normal’, everyday life continues 
amid otherwise seemingly chaotic conflicts. Siapno (2009: 
58) notes the occurrence of so-called ‘post-trauma humour’ 
as a form of resilience among displaced women in East 
Timor; humour is similarly highlighted by Heath-Kelly and 
Jarvis (2016: 243) as offering some the ability to cope and 
come to terms with both specific or risk of future terror 
attacks. I would sometimes make light of the fact that I was 
researching such a ‘cheery topic’ when people asked me 
about what my PhD research was about, rather than engage 
in a direct conversation about how challenging it was at 
times. I pondered whether this constituted some form of 
‘researcher resilience’, but dwelling on this felt irrelevant, 
narcissistic and uncomfortable. Similar forms of stoicism 
were evident among staff too and seem to represent a wide-
spread occupational response among the victim support sec-
tor. As a gatekeeper reflecting on their job once uttered to 
me, ‘If you didn’t laugh, you’d cry’.
Understanding sadness, anger, or other ostensibly diffi-
cult emotions as various forms of emotional labour 
(Hochschild, 2012; Ward and McMurray, 2016), emotion 
work (Dickson-Swift et al., 2009) and participant/researcher 
co-construction (Riessman, 2008: 40) aided in making sense 
of them. That such experiences are increasingly acknowl-
edged within qualitative literatures did genuinely help me to 
keep a sense of perspective on them. However, it is important 
to recognise the peculiarity of the labour process for doctoral 
research students. Face-to-face interaction and production of 
emotional states in others are two pertinent factors in 
Hochschild’s (2012: 147) work, but whether the exercising 
of control by employers over the emotional activity of 
employees necessarily captures the self-directed dynamic of 
impression management among lone researchers remains a 
moot point. That humour surfaces as a natural, automatic, 
spontaneous and often protective response to violence, either 
in research/teaching contexts (see for example, Brina, 2003; 
Moran et al., 2002 respectively) or occupational settings 
beyond the university (see, inter alia, Rowe and Regehr, 
2010; Scott, 2007), is rightly recognised as important socio-
logical phenomena capable of ‘smoothing difficulties and 
creating “mutuality”’ (Watson, 2015: 135). That greater 
attention should be paid to these ‘little things’ we do to steady 
ourselves during our research comes second to the fact that 
we will surely do them anyway.
That is not to say we cannot learn from them. Situating 
our emotional labour as qualitative researchers among a 
range of extraneous but distinctly everyday and routine 
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factors in our lives maintains the always-relational nature of 
research ethics and guards against the charge of narcissism 
often levelled at autoethnographic research accounts (see 
Ellis, 2009 for a rebuttal). The distinction between ‘proce-
dural ethics’ and ‘ethics in practice’ offered in Guillemin and 
Gillam’s account should thus be thought of as both mutually 
inclusive and contingent on our existing relationships, prior 
research experience and ongoing logistical factors such as 
health, work-life balance and mental well-being, independ-
ent of (but potentially affected by) the research topic at hand, 
no matter how harrowing that may be. It is in light of these 
observations that the article now returns to their account.
Emotive research and reflexivity: 
procedural and field ethics-as-practice
Returning to Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) account, pré-
cised in the introduction and used as a comparative device 
for structuring this article, prompts a series of critical and 
appreciative rejoinders. Both the ‘procedural ethics’ and 
‘ethics in practice’ aspects of this research project involved 
the negotiation of what Guillemin and Gillam (2004: 265) 
refer to as dilemmas, or ‘ethically important moments’. 
These are not always dilemmas of the spectacular or ‘red-
letter’ variety where we necessarily find ourselves stuck ‘on 
the horns of a dilemma’ as it were (often quite the opposite) 
– rather a much more every day, mundane and unending sort 
of decision-making but which nonetheless requires decisive-
ness (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 265). Indeed, that ongo-
ing ethical reasoning exhibits this low-key, every day, 
mundane and routine form is one of two central claims made 
by Guillemin and Gillam. The second is their assertion that 
while having an awareness of ethically significant, often 
unexpected, and sometimes risky or challenging moments in 
our research practice (most of which are not necessarily fore-
cast let alone realistically guarded against through research 
ethics committees) is important, this awareness alone ‘is not 
helpful in addressing and dealing with these issues when 
they arise’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 273). ‘Reflexivity’, 
they argue however, is. It is primarily this latter claim, but 
particularly their separation, if chiefly heuristic, between the 
two which is worth mulling over: ethics and its ‘everyday-
ness’; ‘reflexivity’ as the solution to negotiating it.
While Guillemin and Gillam’s article is now 15 years old, 
their two related concerns – ‘reflexivity’ and ‘the everyday’ – 
remain at the heart of social science research methodology and 
ethics debates, even said to represent distinct ‘turns’ contempo-
rarily (see Brownlie, 2018). The extent to which claims of such 
‘turns’ are warranted, useful or accurate remains a moot point 
and is not my concern here. It is nonetheless an important 
debate to return to, so seemingly ubiquitous has their sugges-
tion become in the intervening years; namely, that ‘reflexivity 
encourages researchers to develop the skills to respond appro-
priately [to “ethically important moments”]’ (Guillemin and 
Gillam, 2004: 277). I would argue, however, based 
on experiences described earlier that their separation (albeit 
heuristic) of ethical practice as ‘procedural’/‘practical’ is a little 
too reductive and that their advocation of reflexivity demands a 
somewhat unrealistically prescriptive separation, or lag, 
between practical action, meaning-making and mutual under-
standing (see Mair and Sharrock, forthcoming), including in 
the way we ‘see’ situations unfolding (see Nishizaka, 2000).
Following Lynch (2000: 26–27, emphasis added), reflex-
ivity is not afforded an elevated status as an epistemological 
or moral elixir but rather taken to encompass ‘an unavoida-
ble feature of the way actions (including actions performed, 
and expressions written, by academic researchers) are per-
formed, made sense of and incorporated into social settings’. 
‘Making sense’ of the substantive topic under study and its 
various elements is particularly resonant with the methodo-
logical self-awareness, standpoint and hermeneutic elements 
outlined in Lynch’s reflexivity inventory (Lynch, 2000: 29–
32; see also Berger, 2015), which encompass much of 
Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) work. Like them, Lynch 
reminds us of the importance of acknowledging the wider 
context in which research practices take place. If we think in 
general terms about what reflexivity encompasses, it might 
appear that such accounts are similar. The major difference, 
however, lies in the promise placed on reflexivity as some 
sort of solution to an encountered set of ‘field problems’.
Lynch points to the ethnomethodological reflexivity in the 
work of Harold Garfinkel and Harvey Sacks. Within their 
unorthodox challenge to formal analytic sociology, no matter 
how flexible, adaptive, non-prescriptive and context-sensitive 
our efforts to ‘taking reflexivity seriously’ are, they should 
represent ‘a property of “accounts” (verbal expressions, sig-
nifiers, texts and other formal devices) that is furnished by 
taken-for-granted usage in recurrent circumstances [. . .], not 
associated with any epistemic virtue, cognitive skill or eman-
cipatory interest’ (Lynch, 2000: 34). They point to the fact 
that sociology’s methods and concepts for studying social 
life, including social structures, often assume familiar – ‘but 
unstudied’ – background understandings of ordinary life and 
its workings (Lynch, 2000: 34). That critique withstanding, 
researcher’s attempts to depict the dilemmas we might run 
into during qualitative fieldwork, including the likes I have 
offered here, often only approximate an adequate and trans-
parent account able to be studied by others. This is seldom 
intentional but underscores the importance of carefully cata-
loguing the exchanges and texts which made the gathering of 
subsequent information achievable. As my own examples 
show, when researchers retrospectively attempt to reconstruct 
an account of ethics-in-practice, the taxonomy or heuristic 
sorting of ethical ‘types’ becomes a necessary evil for (only 
partially) reconstructing accounts of practical action.
Guillemin and Gillam’s work has proven undoubtedly 
useful, prompting me to think through my own situated and 
empirical research practices, including before, during, and 
after their completion. Utilising a feminist and science and 
technology studies-inspired approach to what they term 
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‘microethics’ (informed perhaps most notably by the work of 
Sandra Harding), they rightly stress that ‘Reflexivity in 
research is not a single or universal entity but a process – an 
active, ongoing process that saturates every stage of the 
research’ in which ‘our social and political locations [as 
researchers] affect our research’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 
2004: 274, emphases added). It is the special singling out of 
‘the research’, italicised earlier, and the inevitable square 
bracketing ‘[of researchers]’ which often accompanies 
accounts of reflexivity that Lynch (2000) would ultimately 
problematise (for different ethnomethodological approaches 
to this issue, see Kim, 1999). Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004: 
274) chosen subheading – ‘Using Reflexivity in Research’ – 
will undoubtedly peeve scholars, like Lynch (2000), whose 
sensitivities towards the overly virtuous status frequently 
attributed to reflexivity as an ethical-imperative-cum-silver-
bullet solution to ‘ethical dilemmas’ are particularly height-
ened. That is, to suggest even implicitly that ‘Reflexivity’ (as 
theoretical scaffolding) is a boundaried resource to be ‘Used’ 
(deployed, utilised or added) ‘in Research’ (as distinct from 
any other activity) inevitably provokes criticism. As the 
deliberately and unfaithfully separated accounts of my ‘pro-
cedural ethics’ versus my ‘ethics in practice’ presented ear-
lier show, such attempts at separation must inevitably fail if 
we are to faithfully recognise all aspects of research ethics as 
practical action, conducted at all times, whatever the stage of 
any research project, by and between immanently analytical 
social actors in always-already-recognisable context (see 
Sharrock and Button, 1991). The first section of this article 
suggests that practical ethics are typically integral to research 
projects long before institutional review boards even for-
mally recognise them as such.
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) offer a far more nuanced 
and practice-oriented account of reflexivity vis-à-vis research 
ethics than most which goes some way to guarding against 
opposing critique by offering an explicitly non-prescriptive 
account of reflexivity. They are astute to argue that the adop-
tion of quintessentially proactive approaches to ensuring par-
ticipant autonomy, such as those often found in participatory 
action research which transcend the minimalist confines of 
standalone informed consent, ‘would not necessarily lead to 
ethical research practice’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 276) 
– to which we should add – any more than a ‘minimalist 
notion of informed consent’ (Guillemin and Gillam, 2004: 
275) is necessarily a reliable predictor for unethical research 
practice. Again, the study-by-study context is key, but even 
they risk inviting a reductionist reading of their nuanced dis-
cussion of practice with the invocation for ‘more reflexivity’ 
in the hope that it can act as a ‘sensitising notion’ (Guillemin 
and Gillam, 2004: 278). Is it time we stopped lauding the 
virtues of reflexivity in qualitative research? Perhaps not. 
Surely, though, if we are to retain its constant connection 
with everyday practice in appraisals of our research ethics, 
then this must extend to all stages of our research, including 
field encounters which exist both on and off paper. Perhaps 
then we might even start to think about the informed, instruc-
tive and practically useful role ethical review committees 
might be able to play in supportively shaping ethical practice 
in newly developing projects rather than simply rejecting 
them or signing them off.
Conclusion
The research at the heart of this article revolved around a 
highly emotive topic associated with grief and loss. 
Practically, however, it also triggered a range of positive and 
adaptive emotional responses from participants and myself. 
There appeared to be a dialectic relationship between this 
very distressing and sombre topic and the production of 
camaraderie, survivor solidarity and coping mechanisms 
based on humour. This alone is unremarkable. That seem-
ingly incongruous responses to grief and bereavement are so 
commonplace, however, hints towards the perfunctory ten-
dencies of institutional ethical review boards. Their rela-
tionship with researchers seeking ethical approval is 
predominantly geared towards the avoidance and manage-
ment of potential harm, yet they necessarily overlook the 
unseen ‘preliminary’ work undertaken by researchers as 
they manoeuvre themselves into positions of trust and legiti-
macy. Emotional labour and the relationships that develop 
through it become truly integral objects of reflection and 
analysis if we are to make continued sense of our research 
ethics. These findings must not be extrapolated to ‘speak’ 
for other researchers in similar fields, but it is hoped that 
they can contribute to this debate.
This article has shown, through an iterative dialogue with 
Guillemin and Gillam (2004) that the practicalities of qualita-
tive research are a complex and variegated affair carrying dif-
ferent emotional demands and challenges at different periods 
during a project. Using a recently completed doctoral project as 
an illustrative touchstone, it is clear that manoeuvring oneself 
into a position of ethical legitimacy must sometimes be con-
comitantly pursued with prospective research participants and 
those ultimately responsible for granting institutional approval, 
prior to ethical approval being granted. This is not due to eager-
ness or cunningness on the part of the researcher but rather a 
practical demand which provides the opportunity of scoping 
out feasible ways in which a convincing and faithful story of 
ethical safeguarding on paper and ethical judgement in the field 
can be honed prior to submission for approval. Without this 
local knowledge, writing a robust application for ethical review 
would be both difficult and uninformed. Where the understand-
ings and interests of the two groups diverge (prospective par-
ticipants and those conducting ethical review), particularly 
around how trust, confidentiality, safety and harm are to be 
rendered intelligible, as they almost certainly will, researchers 
are automatically and unavoidably engaged in the production 
of local and accountable order, the kinds of which characterise 
a whole variety of everyday human phenomena (qua Garfinkel, 
1967). As researchers, we cannot simply extradite these ‘other’ 
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kinds of decision-making processes under the auspices of 
reflexivity, as though they were phenomenologically unique in 
status, to special issues, eponymous textbooks, or chapter sub-
sections in bad faith. ‘Doing reflexivity’ or ‘Being reflexive’ in 
this sense, then, is not a requisite exercise in methodological 
ground-clearing, after which we can get down to the ‘real’ task 
at hand (be that identifying, creating, entering, leaving, or ana-
lysing research fields), but an inherent and immanent feature of 
all practical activity that we engage in.
There is also an important political point to understanding 
reflexivity and research ethics in this way. First, it does not 
risk the often unreasonable expectation that formal debriefs 
with professional colleagues, variously including gatekeep-
ers, counsellors, supervisors, or mentors, can engender. In 
the examples described here, these debriefs were not stress-
ful or unpleasant but rather ineffectual, failing to account for 
existing relationships (e.g. family members) and mecha-
nisms (such as humour) for negotiating what will always be 
moving and emotionally charged research. To insist on the 
importance of these more formal relationships and meetings 
at the expense of existing sources of support for researchers 
is to extend the bureaucratic reach of the review process 
without taking into account qualitative life. Second, by 
thinking of ethics-as-practice in this way, we might start to 
think more fruitfully about decentering research ethics 
around violence in all manner of ways. This includes 
‘researching the powerful’, an area in desperate need of ethi-
cal reconstruction (Alvesalo-Kuusi and Whyte, 2018). We 
might encourage students and researchers of violence to 
engage more positively with conversations about ‘ethics’ as 
a living and breathing practice, riddled with uncertainties, 
unknowns, contradictions and questions. If we see ‘clearing 
ethics’ only as a mechanical and requisite practice, one of the 
many stepping stones on our way to completing a research 
project, we are in trouble – hurdles and challenges simply get 
airbrushed from view. But similarly, if we approach only 
with caution, then how well are we preparing ourselves and 
each other for those moments when the aftermath of violence 
confronts us in ways that would be impossible, and surely 
unethical, to turn away from?
Imagining an alternative form of ‘procedural ethics’ 
(Guillemin and Gillam, 2004), which not only allows but 
encourages prior engagement in the field, opens up possibili-
ties for an ethical review process of a fundamentally differ-
ent kind. This could focus less one-dimensionally on deficit 
thinking about risk, committing instead to more transparent, 
constructive and dialogical research practice. Research 
access forays frequently begin before ethical approval is 
granted at an institutional level; such institutional processes 
are frequently complained about for delaying the progress of 
projects. This surely represents a missed opportunity for 
institutions and committees of experienced researchers to 
play a more active, useful role in research-led support as 
sounding boards for developing projects during preliminary 
fieldwork. To be sure, this fieldwork should have parameters. 
Examples suggested here include attendance at public or 
semi-public events rather than one-to-one meetings, in work 
places not private residences, and logistical familiarity with 
organisations or communities rather than singling out pro-
spective participants.
Guillemin and Gillam’s (2004) work continues to be a 
useful and nuanced guide to the practicalities of qualitative 
research ethics and an astute observation of how practice 
can quickly diverge from theory. We should not misread 
their account, nor our own frustrations at the somewhat 
mechanical nature of institutional review processes, as a 
justification or call for the deregulation of research safe-
guarding but rather a rallying cry for its ongoing 
improvement.
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Notes
1. The history of the Irish Republican Army (IRA) as a political 
movement, including contested understandings of its visions, 
causes, membership criteria, name and organisational ethos is 
a complex one beyond the scope of this article (though see, for 
example, Coogan, 2002, and English, 2003).
2. George’s brother had been murdered in a hostage situation.
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